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In Rhapsody for the Theatre, Badiou propped the notion of the ethics of play against a theory of the 
subject that had yet to be fully deployed. His reflection remains tentative and he simply suggests 
‘that the actor could very well show a subject without substance,’ that ‘always between-two,  [the 
ethics of play] operates in the pure present of the spectacle, and the public […] gains access to this 
present only in the aftermath of a thought,’ and ultimately that ‘the ethics of play is that of an 
escape’ (Badiou 2008a, 216, 221). There is a delay at work in the ethics of play, an in-between. By 
looking at Nature Theater of Oklahoma’s Life and Times and Gob Squad’s Gob Squad’s Kitchen (You 
Never Had It So Good), this article proposes to examine how an ethics of play could be materially 
deployed in these earpiece performances through the delay, albeit minimal, the in-between text 
or instruction and their actualisation on stage. NTOK’s Life and Times and Gob Squad’s Kitchen have 
little in common except for the fact that both performances rely upon the ability of performers or 
participatory audience members to convincingly speak lines and execute instructions received 
through wireless headphones. However, these similarities become meaningful when seeing the 
two performances through a Badiouan lens and very useful when it comes to explaining what 
Badiou’s elusive notion of the ethics of play might entail. In this article, I revisit two theatre reviews 
I absent-mindedly wrote, or so it seemed at the time, while trying to come to terms with Badiou’s 
notion of the ethics of play. My spectating was under influence, albeit of a philosophical nature and 
this article also assumes its own bias: after all, performance philosophy could also consist of taking 
concepts for an evening at the theatre and make them perform in a sort of play within a play. In 
hindsight, I was also perhaps unconsciously emulating Badiou’s series of short pamphlets about 
theatre in Rhapsody for the Theatre in response to shows he had seen at the time. In his treatise, 
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Badiou rehearses his ideas for the notion of the ethics of play within a three-pronged Theatre 
dialectics. However, he is more than reluctant to directly relate his newly forged concepts to 
specific performances and leaves this to the character of the Empiricist. While it also resists 
empiricism to a degree, this article will suggest how NTOK’s Life and Times and Gob Squad’s Kitchen 
could perform some of Rhapsody for the Theatre’s dialectical tensions between the theatrical State, 
the ethics of play and the spectator-subject. 
A Theatre of presentation 
As a condition for a Theatre event to occur, Badiou’s ethics of play is described in his Rhapsody for 
the Theatre as an escape from representation, but also from what he calls a “theatre of Presence”. 
Badiou’s words are lapidary on this: ‘The Mass is worn out, the theatre of Presence is obliterated’ 
(Badiou 2008a, 217). The ethics of play consists of the performer’s ability to present existence as 
movement away from essence, from the innate, the inherent, the intrinsic. As opposed to theatre 
and its predetermined roles, Theatre (capital T) is presented as the antithesis of the Catholic mass 
because it is not ruled by substantialism. Badiou stresses that what he considers to be bad theatre 
‘gives up on the ethics of play insofar as it distributes substances’ (Badiou 2008a, 220). Moreover, 
the idea that the ethics of play goes against any theatre of Presence is in line with Badiou’s 
transitory ontology. The concept of Presence (capital P) has to be understood here as it is being 
used by Badiou in Rhapsody for the Theatre in an analogy with the Catholic Mass in terms of 
substantialism and transcendence; while it might evoke certain aspects of it, it does not encompass 
the whole complexity of what the notion of presence has come to refer to in Performance Studies. 
For Badiou, any ontological investigation is irremediably localised and Theatre can only happen in 
the here and now of a materialised performance. Being as a global transcending entity or as an 
absent Presence or, in Heideggerian terms, “being in totality” is out of the question.  He extracts a 
theorem of the non existence of ‘total being’ from the fundamental axioms of set-theory, which he 
sees as the principles of what he calls the ontology of the multiple: there is no set which contains 
all the sets. It is impossible to conceive a multiple, thus a being, which would be the aggregate of 
all the possible beings. Since for Badiou, being is also only by being-there, he brushes aside the 
question of the essence of being to focus on appearing as for him appearing is the site of being 
when conceived in all its multiplicity. Since the materialisation of being-there implies a situation, a 
site, appearing is what links or connects being to its site. Thus the essence of appearing is precisely 
that connection and not something predetermined by the situation or the site. In the case of 
Theatre, that connection is governed by the ethics of play. Within Badiou’s Theatre dialectics, the 
ethics of play enables the spectator-subject to think the relation between the inconsistency of 
being as a pure multiple and the consistency of its appearing. For Badiou, accessing the idea of the 
pure multiplicity of being does not happen by ‘shunning appearing, nor by singing the praises of 
the virtual […] but by thinking appearing as appearing, and thus as this part of being, which 
happens to appear, and offers itself to thought as a deceit of seeing’ (Badiou 2008b, 23). This is the 
reason why while he refutes a theatre of Presence, Badiou advocates a theatre of presentation. 
The aim of the ethics of play is precisely the provocation of presentation—not the presentation of 
being but that of appearing since according to Badiou’s ontology, ‘being does not in any manner 
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let itself be approached, but solely allows itself to be sutured in its void to the brutality of a 
deductive consistency without aura’ (Badiou 2006, 10). To provoke presentation, the ethics of play 
demands that actors resort to decisive bodily and vocal gestures. However, Badiou stresses that 
‘the central virtue of the actor is not technical but ethical’ (Badiou 2008a, 219). Theatre’s play of 
differences and the celebration of being as a multiple are not the main reasons why Badiou speaks 
of ethics. He explains that actors cannot rely upon effects—as these would equate acting to a 
straight imitation of an object or a caricature of predetermined roles, but upon gestures clearly 
signifying availability, an opening (Badiou 2008a, 219). He stresses that the ethics of play is only 
possible from the edge of the void, in other words, at the threshold of the absence of an object to 
imitate. The actor’s provocation of presentation has to point to the out of joint nature of a world 
where ‘nothing coincides with itself’ (Badiou 2008a, 221).  
In episode 1 of NTOK’s Life and Times, everyday routine in a New Jersey suburban town is strangely 
conveyed on stage through Spartakiada inspired choreography drawing from a series of athletic 
exercises developed in Czechoslovakia and other Eastern Bloc countries for mass political 
celebrations. On stage, the ballet of red balls, white squares, blue scarves and yellow gymnastic 
rings creates visual jolts that combine with the prosodic and at times, operatic delivery of lines to 
hypnotic effect. The performers execute these movements with utmost precision following the 
instructions of a conductor. It seems that this choreography somehow answers to Badiou’s 
imperatives in terms of the ethics of play. The performers’ commitment to incessant instructions 
to perform such or such a movement does not confer them an auratic presence, but their incessant 
activity is mesmerising. However, they never embody the real-life character whose story they are 
telling, instead their industrious choreography of decisive bodily and vocal gestures resembles a 
technical assembly line that would disperse any notion of embodiment and yet provide the 
audience with the consistency of an absence or with the consistent failure to represent a life story. 
The playtext of NTOK’s Life and Times is an edited version of a 16-hour phone conversation between 
Pavol Liska and Kristin Worrall, a member of the company during which Worral tries to answer the 
question: “Can you tell me your life story?” The performance shares most characteristics of 
headphone verbatim as defined by Caroline Wake: 
In headphone verbatim, the performance displays not only its source material but 
also the mechanical device needed to record and repeat that material. In both 
rehearsal and performance, the actors wear headphones, through which they hear 
the audio script. They then repeat that script as immediately and exactly as 
possible, including—as noted above—every stammer, pause, and repetition. (Wake 
2013, 322–323) 
However, Wake is reluctant to describe NTOK’s work as headphone verbatim because their 
approach is not strictly documentary (Wake 2013, 330). In this, Wake agrees with Karinne Keithley 
who stresses that Copper does not ‘simply “document” a nonfictional reality as documentary 
theatre might; rather, in collaboration with the company, she collects, transcribes, and orders 
linguistic data so that they may collectively energize it on stage’ (Keithley 2010, 69). Although the 
text of Life and Times has been edited, it retains all the hesitations of the phone conversation and 
is punctuated by a large number of “ums” and silences. As argued by Rachel Anderson-Rabern, 
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NTOK’s work could be described as developing an awareness for ethical listening (Anderson-
Rabern 2010, 96), however here their methods for recording, structuring and performing everyday 
gesture and language will be analysed as an ethics of play. When channelled through the 
headphones, these repetitive “ums”, pauses and hesitations contribute to replicate the distance 
inherent to any phone conversation, but also to highlight the transmission delay, that is then 
reproduced when the text received through the earpiece on stage is then spoken. This also 
highlights the sense of the elliptical and of the unexpected that govern the piece.  
As directors of NTOK, Liska and Kelly Copper have developed several techniques and dramaturgies 
of chance over the years and in this performance. In Life and Times, both randomly prompt the 
performers to reproduce rehearsed gestures or sequences of movements. Copper is conducting 
the performers from the orchestra with a set of instructions displayed on cue-cards not visible 
from the auditorium, while Liska assigns lines to the performers through their earpiece. Following 
John Cage and Richard Foreman, there is in fact no work by NTOK that was not written in large part 
with dice, decks of cards or coins. However, as Florian Malzacher stresses ‘chance is not completely 
arbitrary. Rather it is something that comes to you and then in a sense belongs to you. Something 
that one must view as a challenge and which demands flexibility of thought. Leaving certain 
decisions to chance does not equal less work; it merely shifts the focus’ (Malzacher 2012, 19). In 
Inaesthetics, Badiou asserts that ‘a theatrical representation will never abolish chance’ and in 
Rhapsody for the Theatre, that ‘the paradox of theatre […] lies in the fact that it presents itself as a 
figurative luxury, a solid chain, a cultural temple, but […] it is actually made of flight and chance’ 
(Badiou 2004, 74 and 2008a, 199). Within Badiou’s Theatre dialectics, the ethics of play ensures that 
chance is allowed to disrupt the system of representation, while in his theory of the event, fidelity 
‘names a process that separates and discerns the becoming legal of chance’ (Riera 2005, 12). 
Chance becomes the rule when the evental subject has decided upon the undecidable inherent to 
the event to choose a new law to follow. To an extent, Badiou’s Rhapsody for the Theatre announces 
his theory of the event since the ethics of play might well ensure the becoming legal of chance 
when it comes to the Theatre event. To an extent, the actor’s ethical availability that Badiou insists 
upon, amounts to an ethical opening to chance and consequently to the endless possibilities and 
configurations of the new.  
Life and Times might not be a staged attempt to recollect someone’s life story by excavating and 
ordering past experiences, but a discourse on chance and existential randomness. On stage, 
performers appear extremely focused and at the same time totally lost as they are literally kept on 
their toes by the quick succession of random and at times, contradictory instructions they are 
meant to follow. In her review of the performance, Helen Shaw remarks that ‘we see their anxious 
micro-expressions as their eyes slew to the prompter, checking for the next move’ (Shaw 2013, 5). 
Although the performers draw from a well-rehearsed repertoire of actions, they are constantly on 
the edge especially when they serve food to the entire audience at every interval or in a more comic 
fashion in episode 3, when they are forced to swap the lines of Agatha Christie’s play The Mousetrap 
for the lines of the performance’s telephone conversation verbatim transcript, while staying in The 
Mousetrap’s stereotyped characters when it comes to expressions and movements. This 
melodramatic atmosphere is suddenly disrupted by the apparition of silver body-suited aliens 
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armed with giant party popper guns. Malzacher explains that when ‘it becomes apparent that an 
actor has developed patterns or strategies for saving himself, that effort must be thwarted. 
Salvation is boring and the bar is steadily set higher through, for example, continually inserting 
new dances into a piece. Being over challenged is not an imperfection but rather intentional’ 
(Malzacher 2013, 5). The restless agitation and volubility of the performers cannot disguise the 
fragmented nature of the narrative nor its explicit randomness. As pointed out by Jacob Gallagher-
Ross, audience members are ‘constantly reminded of the gaps, the fissures, the forgotten or poorly 
recollected people. The pointillist particularity of the memories Worrall has managed to keep only 
gestures to the vast swathes of time and experience forever lost to her (or any of us)’ (Gallagher-
Ross 2012, 70). During the performance, we are constantly reminded of the obvious, but no less 
painful, impossibility to tell a life story in its entirety. NTOK develop in fact a complex dramaturgy 
of ellipses as their performance unfolds in a syncopated mode. In Life and Times episode 1, the text 
appears as supertitles on two screens while the performers sing the lines they are being fed 
through earpieces. Shaw remarks that ‘ripples of laughter move through the audience as the droll, 
uninflected “voice” of the supertitles elevates what happens below into an opera—and since we 
read faster than they can sing—syncopates our response to it’ (Shaw 2013, 5). There are thus two 
levels of syncopation in the performance: the one directly experienced by the audience reading 
then listening and the one spectators experience in the form of a brief delay when watching 
performers processing the lines they receive through their earpieces before uttering them. 
Copper stresses that Life and Times ‘is not meant to be an all encompassing biography—or even a 
biography, for that matter’ and that they use the first person account as ‘a lens for a more enlarged 
consideration of self, community, and history.’ (Copper 2013, 7) When Worrall names herself in the 
text, other performers use their names instead and Copper stresses that ‘though the language in 
Life and Times is all first-person singular, the “I” in performance is very much plural’ (Copper 2013, 
7). Remembering is presented as an activation of compossible experiences. As pointed out by 
Shaw, ‘for some, the multiplying voices emphasize a kind of choral sensation that those on stage 
are repeating our own private, often embarrassing memories’ (Shaw, 2013, 6). This is even more 
striking that most of the audience members’ childhoods have in theory very little to do with growing 
up in a New Jersey suburban town. What is being drawn over the 12 hours of the performance is a 
multi-layered memory map where we are left to wander, backtrack and which ultimately leads us 
to address our own apparently forgotten childhood and teenage years. There are recurrent names 
or narrative motifs which provide some bearings within the epic tale, but also moments where the 
narration seems to hit a dead-end or an incommensurable gap: for example there are several 
mentions of the child staring at ‘mum’ cooking through the bars of a wooden bench’s back or 
staring at the rug and saying with the nostalgic tone of an ineluctable loss “I need to remember 
this moment for the rest of my life.” Paradoxically, these moments have the soothing effect to 
reiterate the randomness of memory and qualify as worth remembering moments that could have 
on the contrary seemed insignificant at the time. Rather than a life story, we are presented with 
flashes of experience that in turn trigger our own and we are encouraged to open the floodgate of 
long neglected but now revived memories. This collective act of remembering is enabled by the 
emphasis placed on hesitations and syncopations in the performance that invites spectators to 
delve into their own past. In the words of Jean Luc Nancy, NTOK’s dramaturgy of syncopation 
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generates ‘the emptiness or the opening of this space—its very spatiality or its many spacings 
(espacements): it is the place of our compearance’ (Nancy 1992, 373). The ethics of play at work in 
NTOK’s Life and Times fractures the theatrical state, that is, a system of representation 
conventionally ruled by the projection of an alleged inner self upon predetermined categories. The 
ethics of play calls for an escape from the self into the collective by inscribing the spectator-subject 
in the syncopated time of the delay between instruction and action, between interpellation and 
commitment. In Gob Squad’s Kitchen (You’ve Never Had It So Good), Gob Squad resort to earpieces 
to develop a strategy similar to that deployed by NTOK. However, the complexity of Gob Squad’s 
apparatuses to create “spacings” makes the place of compearance they generate very interesting 
to analyse. 
A performance of spectrality 
Gob Squad’s Gob Squad’s Kitchen (You’ve Never Had It So Good) is an attempt at a live re-enactment 
of Andy Warhol’s filmed performance Kitchen. ‘This reconstitution of the 60s is presented as a 
demystification: the film projected to the audience is shot live behind the screen that becomes 
more porous a barrier as the piece unfolds. Ultimately performers ask audience members to stand 
in for them “guess-performing” the original Kitchen and, as if by magic, the “volunteers” suddenly 
exude a screen/stage presence, which transcends technology and demonstrates the mysterious 
power of theatre’s immediacy’ (Dalmasso 2011, 32). These hasty comments have been calling for 
some explanation for some time and I would now like to explain what I could have meant when 
reviewing this show. When referring to a mysterious immediacy, I probably had in mind what 
Jacques Derrida defines as ‘a spectral moment, [as] a moment that no longer belongs to time, if 
one understands by this word the linking of modalized presents (past present, actual present: 
‘now’, future present’ (Derrida 1994, xx). What Gob Squad achieve overall in Kitchen is to recreate 
moments in time, that of the original Warhol films Kitchen, Kiss and his series of Screen Tests. Gob 
Squad performers repeatedly say “this is real”, that they are “in the moment” or even “full of the 
moment” while also continuously pointing to their incapacity to be other than themselves 
performing themselves and to the difficulties to be themselves then, that is while impersonating 
Warhol’s performers in May 1965 when the original Kitchen was filmed (Gob Squad 2011). Gob 
Squad’s Kitchen could be described as a playful experience of spectrality. It is not so much Warhol’s 
actors who haunt Gob Squad performers, it is more their everyday selves haunting themselves as 
performers trying to impersonate the original Kitchen performers. Although commenting upon 
their creative process throughout, the performers do not of course talk in terms of spectres or 
spectrality. As Derrida would remark, you probably would have to be an academic, a scholar to ‘be 
capable beyond the opposition between presence and non-presence, actuality and inactuality, life 
and non life, of thinking the possibility of the specter, the specter as possibility’ (Derrida 1994, 12). 
Gob Squad’s Kitchen raises issues in terms of the interaction between two different types of 
spectral materiality—that of the stage and that of the screen, and in terms of the shift between 
projected and non-projected appearance throughout the performance. To an extent, it is possible 
to describe what happens on stage as an interaction between two different intensities or two 
materialities of appearance. Supposing that there is a difference, a shift, a movement between two 
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intensities of appearance, this invokes the possibility of a spectre or the spectre of a possibility: 
precisely that of a spectre able to move from one world or materiality to another and/or that of 
what is impossible in one world to become possible in another. In any case, Gob Squad’s Kitchen 
presents us with a porous moment, a disjointed time between the now of Gob Squad’s 
performance and the now of Warhol’s 1965 film.  
By playing with the theatricality of the spectral, Gob Squad provide us with an aesthetics and a 
stage configuration to observe the dialectics at work between stage and screen, theatre and 
cinema. Their dramaturgy creates a dialectical space in between different materialities of 
performance or intensities of appearing through constant shifts from one ‘world’ to another. 
However, it remains difficult to bridge the gap and precisely explore the dialectical movement 
between the cinematic and the theatrical as a shift between two modalities of performance or two 
different intensities of existence. There is also the risk of adopting a dialectical standpoint that 
might ultimately send theatre and cinema back to back and fail to do justice to the trespassing 
spectres. Yet, ‘the dividing line between the ghost and actuality ought to be crossed’ (Derrida 1994, 
38) and this is largely what Gob Squad do, simply because by inviting audience members to stand 
in for performers joyfully failing to embody Warhol’s screen personae, Gob Squad’s Kitchen opens 
up a possibility for anybody in the audience to encounter their own spectre in the form of a 
potential different self, perhaps even a potential other within themselves. This is not simply hinted 
at, or pointed at, but this potentiality is materially created on stage by precisely materialising a 
screen appearance and transferring an image upon a three-dimensional stage. And this works on 
many levels: Gob Squad live performers attempt to embody and flesh out, so to speak, the 1965 
celluloid performers in Warhol films, then Gob Squad performers become celluloid, then 
dematerialised as mere voices whispering through headphones as they are in turn embodied by 
audience members. It is precisely the multiplication of bodies, the repetition of the embodiment 
process that creates this possibility for spectres. However, this embodiment paradoxically seems 
to equate dematerialisation and desynchronisation as each level of performance implies a degree 
of disappearance. This is the case for Gob Squad performers disappearing backstage behind a 
screen for their image to be projected to the audience; this is also the case for the audience 
members disappearing backstage behind the screen or when on stage behind the headphone 
apparatus as their movements are dictated by Gob Squad performers acting like remote puppet-
masters. However, the embodiment is not unilateral, there is a constant back-and-forth between 
embodied and embodying creating a movement of diffused origin. The time is out of joint and after 
a while we are unsure of where the performers are and of who is haunting whom. There is a 
crossing of several worlds: that of 1965, that of performers live on screen re-enacting Warhol’s film, 
that of the same performers performing themselves on screen and on stage, that of the audience 
members, that of audience members impersonating performers, that of performers becoming 
audience members, etc. This movement across realities creates the possibility of a crossing and 
consequently a spectral possibility or potentiality. What remains striking with Gob Squad is the 
importance they attach to the materiality of their creative process. Audience members enter 
backstage and as they make their way through to the auditorium behind a massive screen, they 
walk through the film set but also among cameras, wires and other filming apparatuses. This 
invitation to materially take part in the performance culminates, when in their attempt to recreate 
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Warhol’s Kitchen, Gob Squad performers gradually replace themselves by audience members one 
after the other as a last resort and declare that they cannot reproduce the ‘aura of the people in 
the original film’ (Gob Squad 2011). However it is not a simple reversal of places. Audience 
members literally stand in for them, being told what to do and say through big headphones that 
are not disguised. However, despite the artifice being over exposed, as their images appear on the 
screen, the volunteered audience members seem to suddenly exude an uncanny presence. What 
occurs towards the end of Gob Squad’s Kitchen seems to exceed the aims of participatory theatre 
in terms of audience involvement. Here, the performers are not only replaced, but audience 
members achieve what performers could not. As they appear on the screen, their image is 
constructed so as to evoke the improvised ‘auratic presence’ of the original Warhol performers. 
More precisely, Gob Squad builds a sense of expectation until that point in the performance and it 
is undeniable that when the audience members replace the performers, something happens. They 
appear as believable embodiments of the original Kitchen’s real characters. This transformation 
has been prepared by the script and by Gob Squad performers’ intentional repetitive failed attempt 
to achieve the detached self-consciousness allegedly displayed in Warhol’s original film. Not only 
the volunteered audience members seem to exude a particular presence, but somehow they seem 
suddenly more ‘present’—read granted a higher intensity of appearance—than Gob squad 
performers. One might argue that the audience members are non-performing and that in itself 
might ‘present’ something beyond the performers’ reach, and perhaps we might be touching upon 
“the real” Gob Squad performers claim to be the object of their performance quest throughout 
(Gob Squad 2011).  
In Warhol’s original films used as a basis for Gob Squad’s re-enactment, be it Kitchen, Kiss, Eat, Sleep 
or the Screen Tests, the performers are asked to act as if the camera was not there. In fact, it is well 
documented that for part of the Screen Tests, Warhol pretends to go and make a coffee and does 
not tell the person he is filming that the camera is rolling. David James argues that the camera is a 
presence and under its gaze and against its silence the person must construct herself or himself. 
He insists that because the camera ‘makes performance inevitable, it constitutes being as 
performance’ (James 1989, 69). While in Warhol’s Kitchen, performers ignore the camera, escape 
from its glance and pretend it is not there, the contrary occurs in Gob Squad’s Kitchen where 
everything is performed for the camera, in fact for the audience watching the big screen separating 
them from the performers performing live backstage. Most of the time, instead of being (or 
pretending to be) oblivious of the camera, Gob Squad performers alternate in fact between 
pretend self-consciousness and pretend non self-consciousness in front of the camera. However, 
when the audience members perform, they are given more instructions, more lines to repeat and 
there seems to be very little room or time for self-consciousness. They have very little leeway to 
perform themselves performing Kitchen as Gob Squad performers did. The audience members do 
not perform but they are performed upon; they become material for performance not performers. 
With Gob Squad’s Kitchen, we are definitely dealing with being-there and appearing: the being-
there of theatre, the appearing of cinema and potentially vice-versa. If only because of the use of 
a screen as a mediator between the live performance happening backstage and the audience, it 
would be tempting to analyse Gob Squad’s performance in terms of a screen ‘presence’ overtaking 
that of performers on stage. In fact, the audience members receive instructions through 
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headphones, they are prompted to say such and such lines and as such they are rather over-
performing. And yet something shifts in the modality of performance. This might be simply the 
result of a higher degree of appearing intensities. Perhaps audience members turned performers 
seem more materially here as they are grounded by instructions and cumbersome headphones. 
In any case, the syncopated rhythm of the lines delivery due to the delay in transmitting what they 
are fed through headphones inscribe the audience members turned performers in a time slightly 
out-of-sync or out-of-joint.  
In Gob Squad’s Kitchen, the camera creates a relation to the site that at first sight does not seem to 
be predetermined in the sense that it allows the performance to invent a new relation to the site—
a life-performance situation including live footage, and thus to reveal a new site, that of an 
intersection or conflagration of different past, present and possibly future worlds. Nevertheless in 
Gob Squad’s re-enactment of Warhol’s filming session, the way the camera inadvertently captures 
“being as performance” is far from being completely non-predetermined (James 1989, 69). Every 
plan has been carefully thought through even when there is scope for improvisation at particular 
moments and even if Gob Squad’s performers cannot fully control the audience members turned 
performers. However, paradoxically it seems that the use of earpieces and the delay between 
instruction and execution, or live directing and acting, resets the audience’s expectation of the 
unexpected. Suddenly, in these suspended fractions of a second, it is as if the cumbersome 
apparatus becomes invisible and leaves space for the unpredictable. 
Ontological delay and inexist[a]nce 
According to Badiou, ‘Being does not diffuse itself in rhythm and image, it does not reign over 
metaphor, it is the null sovereign of inference’ (Badiou 2006, 10). By rhythm Badiou refers here to 
repetition and this remark has to be understood in relation to the idea explained earlier that being 
is necessarily subtracted from representation—a subtraction that can only be grasped in the 
materiality of being-there that precisely reveals the void of a situation, its underpinning vacuum, 
as the substratum of being. However, following French linguist and philosopher Henri Meschonnic, 
rhythm could be defined not as a regularity of similar intervals or recurrences, based on repetition, 
periodicity and measure, but as dispositions or configurations without any fixedness or natural 
necessity and resulting from an arrangement that is always subject to change. Meschonnic sees 
rhythm as a subjective configuration of meaning in the discourse, as the mark of the subject 
(Meschonnic 1982, 70). Similarly, if rhythm is defined not as the regular recurrence of the same but 
as what eludes repetition and points to the void through for example, syncopation, then any 
presentation of a gap, of a delay could be considered ontological. According to an ethics of play 
turned ethics of appearing, the site of appearing would not be the body of the performer or 
participants. It is the gap or delay in between the instruction given through the earpiece and its 
execution that would give consistency to appearing and thus provide the substratum for 
performance. To an extent, it would make sense to suggest that in the case of Gob Squad’s Kitchen 
and NTOK’s Life and Times, the site where being ‘allows itself to be sutured in its void to the brutality 
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of a deductive consistency without aura’, is the connection, the interplay, the delay, the gap, the 
void (Badiou 2006, 10).  
In the case of Gob Squad’s Kitchen and NTOK’s Life and Times, what happens to appear in the gap 
provided by the delay is a haunting, an inexist[a]nce that surges forth from the void of 
representation. In NTOK’s Life and Times, this is only possible because representation is fractured 
to allow the coincidental emergence of other possibles through the syncopated performance. 
Between screen and stage, the dramaturgy of Gob Squad’s Kitchen also generate “many spacings” 
to create a place of “compearance”, in that case, space for a collusion of performers and audience 
members through a restless mirroring of different performance moments (Nancy 1992, 373). For 
Badiou, Theatre (capital T), does not give substance to differences and ‘turns every representation, 
every actor’s gesture, into a generic vacillation so as to put differences to the test without any 
supporting base’ (Badiou 2008a, 219–220). No absolute reference is required to effect a 
differentiation, to install a distance. This is the reason why the actor abiding to the ethics of play 
does not need an object to imitate, but needs to present a constant minimal self-distancing. I would 
like to suggest that the function of the delay is to create the possibility for a syncopated self. This 
gap in the performance ensures that nothing exactly coincides with itself and points to the 
perpetual resetting or deferral of any referent and ultimately to the possibility for the radical new 
to emerge, for the impossible to occur. Badiou describes in fact the ethics of play as ‘an 
inauguration of meaning’ and for him, Theatre (capital T) ‘presents differences as objectless 
transparencies’ and ‘does not exist except in the act itself’ (Badiou 2008a, 220). There is no ground 
for differences, they just appear as such in action. This is what Badiou means when he writes that 
‘theatre proposes to us a signification of supposed substances, and Theatre (capital T), a procedure 
exhibiting generic humanity, that is to say, indiscernible differences that take place on stage for 
the first time’ (Badiou 2008a, 220). Acting becomes ethical not by erasing all differences but by 
pointing out the arbitrary nature of any marker of difference, and thus by showing on stage the 
‘evaporation of every stable essence’ (Badiou 2008a, 221). The ethics of play precisely consists of 
an escape from any system of representation, or differentiation. The delay at work in the 
transmission of lines serves as a reminder that what grounds performance is precisely that 
opening onto the perpetually same but different and not a closing down in different categories. 
This resonates with the way both NTOK and Gob Squad work. For Badiou, actors have to literally 
engage in a play. Like in the original éthique du jeu, the English term “play” refers as much to a game 
as to acting. For Badiou, there is ‘a cogito of the actor […]: I am not where one thinks that I am, 
being there where I think that one thinks that the other is’ (Badiou 2008a, 216). This is also the 
paradox of the actor as defined by Badiou to point to what subtracts itself, to present the void, to 
signify an opening, but also an availability. For the actors, the ethics of play consists of playing an 
endless hide and seek game as much with themselves as with the audience and this is precisely 
what happens in Gob Squad’s Kitchen and Life and Times. According to Badiou’s definition of 
existence, there are only fluctuating degrees of appearing in a given world, variable intensities of 
being-there. His conception of Theatre supports this and, to an extent, it seems that in the case of 
the two earpiece performances under scrutiny here, life lets itself only be approached as a delay, 
a syncopation, a hiatus, a subtraction, an inexist[a]nce. 
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Syncopation is at the core of the shift in Badiou’s theory of the subject from a political subject 
identified as ‘We’ or ‘I’ to a subjective instance which is precisely what is not supposed to exist and 
which bears the mark of the exception, that is, a subject whose affirmation takes the form of a 
hiatus, a void, a grammatical incision. In Logics of Worlds, Badiou explains that the subject resides 
in: 
the “aside from”, the “except that”, the “but for”, through which the fragile 
scintillation of what has no place to be makes its incision in the unbroken phrasing 
of a world. “What has no place to be” should be taken in both possible senses: as 
that which, according to the transcendental law of the world (or of the appearing 
of beings), should not be; but also as that which subtracts itself (out of place) from 
the worldly localization of multiplicities, from the place of being, in other words, 
from being-there. (Badiou 2009d, 45) 
Badiou’s theatre articulates the subject in such a manner that it follows the theoretical shift from 
a named subject to a subject marked by inexist[a]nce. The ethics of play conceived as an escape in 
Badiou’s Rhapsody for the Theatre seems to rehearse the notion of inexist[a]nce developed in his 
more recent Logics of Worlds. For Badiou, inexist[a]nce is a mode of existence: existence measures 
the degree of appearance of an object in a world: inexist[a]nce being the minimal degree of 
appearing in a world (Badiou 2009d, 322). To an extent, he derives the notion of inexist[a]nce from 
Derrida’s notion of différance. For Badiou, inexist[a]nce is a materialist ‘worldly way of non-existing’ 
(Badiou 2009c, 144). In Pocket Pantheon, Badiou explains that what is at stake in Derrida’s work is 
‘the inscription of the non-existent’ and the recognition that such an inscription is impossible. 
Endorsing Derrida’s approach, Badiou stresses ‘You must demonstrate the vanishing point by 
making language free. You must have a language of flight. You can only organise a monstration of 
the non-existent if you use a language that can stand non-existing’ (Badiou 2009c, 144). Badiou’s 
ethics of play conceived as an escape from representation provides if not a language of flight, at 
least a dispositive to account for what inexists in a world. In this respect, the transitory nature of 
politics is precisely what is at stake in Badiou’s ethics of play insofar as politics is defined as ‘the art 
of the impossible’ (Badiou 2009a, 317). For Badiou, politics has ‘value only insofar as it prescribes 
a “possibility” for a situation that the immanent norm of this situation defines precisely as 
impossible’ (Badiou 2009b, 48). In other words, for Badiou politics occurs when what was not given 
any place in a given situation, suddenly comes to the fore. Badiou considers different degrees or 
intensities of existence in a given world or situation and ultimately equates true politics to the 
raising up of the inexistent, that is, the emergence in a given situation of what was not deemed 
possible (Badiou 2011, 80). Within Badiou’s philosophical system it is the notion of inexist[a]nce 
that seems to be the most closely related to the ethics of play because inexist[a]nce is also of a 
transitory nature. In terms of performance, the ethics of play ensures the creation of a gap, a delay, 
and that space is made for ‘what has no place to be’ and to an extent, this is what relates the 
headphone dramaturgies of Gob Squad’s Kitchen and NTOK’s Life and Times to politics as defined by 
Badiou.  
To conclude, Badiou’s notions of ethics of play and inexist[a]nce delineate a non-space, a void that 
seems to materially appear in Gob Squad’s Kitchen and NTOK’s Life and Times through the delay 
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rendered manifest by the headphone dramaturgies. In NTOK’s Life and Times, the dissemination of 
suburban life fragments through headphone transmission creates an aesthetics of the everyday 
detached from its representation. Because of the transmission delay, the real life narrative is 
opened up and remembering is presented as an activation of choral compossible experiences. As 
for Gob Squad’s Kitchen, it blurs the boundaries between performance and non-performance, but 
the transmission delay empowers the audience members turned performers and consequently 
the whole audience to embrace the possibility not only of a reversal of places on stage and beyond, 
but to consider the possibility for the destruction of the system of places, for the raising up of the 
inexistent. This is in line with the way, in Badiou’s Rhapsody for the Theatre, the ethics of play 
emancipates spectator-subjects towards the collapse of the theatrical state. 
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